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 FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
 TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2170
 INFO RUMTBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK 1614
 RUEHKL/AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR 5192
 RUEHML/AMEMBASSY MANILA 2493
 RUEHGP/AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE 0754
 RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 2153
 RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2047
 RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1340
 RUFHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 2580
 RUMJNG/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 8796
 RUMJFS/AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE 1263
 RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 6438
 ZEN/AMEMBASSY BANDAR SERI BEGAWAN POUCH

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EZ1:

■ S E C R E T JAKARTA 03614 ■

EXDIS

EZ2:

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MOPS, ID, VM, US

SUBJECT: ASSISTANT SECRETARY WOLFOWITZ'S MEETING

- WITH FONMIN MOCHTAR: POW/MIA'S AND

- U.S.-SRV NORMALIZATION

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1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.

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2. SUMMARY: MOST OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY WOLFOWITZ'S MARCH 1 MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER MOCHTAR CENTERED ON THE POW/MIA ISSUE AND PROSPECTS FOR U.S.-SRV NORMALIZATION. ON POW/MIA'S, MOCHTAR OFFERED TO ACT AS AN "INTERMEDIARY" WITH HANOI AND INDICATED HE INTENDED TO SPEAK VERY BLUNTLY WITH THE VIETNAMESE IN URGING THEM TO SETTLE THE PROBLEM. AFTER LISTENING CAREFULLY TO MR. WOLFOWITZ'S PRESENTATION OUTLINING U.S. CONDITIONS FOR NORMALIZING RELATIONS WITH VIETNAM, MOCHTAR SAID HE THOUGHT THE "U.S. CONNECTION" WOULD BE A CRUCIAL CONSIDERATION IN ANY HANOI DECISION TO SETTLE THE CAMBODIA PROBLEM. THROUGHOUT THE MEETING, MOCHTAR APPEARED RELAXED ABOUT THE PRESENT CAMBODIAN SITUATION, AND EXPRESSED OPTIMISM THE VIETNAMESE MAY BE MOVING SLOWLY TOWARD A REALIZATION THAT THEIR POLICIES CANNOT PREVAIL OVER TIME. MOCHTAR'S REMARKS ON THE RECENT CSIS-VIETNAMESE SEMINAR, U.S.-PRC RELATIONS, AND THE INCREASE IN PRESS REPORTS OF UNEXPLAINED SHOOTINGS ARE COVERED SEPTELS. END SUMMARY.

3. IN RESPONSE TO THE AMBASSADOR'S QUESTION, MOCHTAR SAID HIS VISIT TO HANOI HAD BEEN POSTPONED UNTIL MID-MARCH. ORIGINALLY, HE HAD PROPOSED FEBRUARY 27 AS A STARTING DATE, ON THE CONDITION THE SRV BORDER ATTACKS HAD CEASED BY THEN. AFTER SEVERAL DAYS DELAY, THE VIETNAMESE INDICATED THIS WAS IMPOSSIBLE. MOCHTAR THEN PROPOSED MARCH 2-5, BUT AFTER WAITING TEN DAYS OR SO THE VIETNAMESE RESPONDED THIS WOULD ALSO BE IMPOSSIBLE AND SUGGESTED THE ORIGINAL FEBRUARY 27 DATE. MOCHTAR DECLINED, NOTING HIS SCHEDULE WAS ALREADY FULL, AND ASKED WHETHER SOMETHING COULDN'T BE WORKED OUT DURING THE MARCH 2-5 PERIOD. THE VIETNAMESE BEGGED OFF, INDICATING THERE WOULD BE A "SECRET MISSION" IN HANOI AT THAT TIME, BUT OFFERING A MID-MARCH VISIT. KNOWING THIS WOULD CAUSE PROBLEMS WITH THE OLAF PALME (MARCH 6-8) AND HAYDEN (MARCH 8-10) VISITS, MOCHTAR THEN PROPOSED MARCH 14-17, BUT SAID THE VIETNAMESE HAVE NOT YET RESPONDED. ALL IN ALL, HE SAID HE WAS UNDER THE IMPRESSION THE VIETNAMESE WERE UP TO SOMETHING SINCE HE COULD NOT UNDERSTAND WHAT WOULD PREVENT HIM FROM VISITING IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO THE PALME VISIT.

4. MR. WOLFOWITZ AND THE AMBASSADOR TOLD MOCHTAR THAT, FROM WHAT HE HAD SAID, THE VIETNAMESE APPEARED TO BE UP TO THEIR OLD TRICKS AGAIN. NSC ADVISOR RICHARD CHILDRESS WOULD BE IN HANOI MARCH 3-5 AT VIETNAMESE REQUEST TO DISCUSS BILATERAL HUMANITARIAN ISSUES, ESPECIALLY POW/MIA'S, AND IT WOULD APPEAR THAT

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THE VIETNAMESE ARE TRYING TO USE THE VISIT TO CREATE SUSPICIONS AMONG THE ASEANS AND OTHERS THAT SOMETHING WAS UP BETWEEN HANOI AND WASHINGTON. MR. WOLFOWITZ ASSURED MOCHTAR THAT THE CHILDRESS VISIT IN NO WAY CONSTITUTED A "SECRET MISSION," AND THAT WE INDEED WOULD BE ANNOUNCING IT TOMORROW. IN THE MEAN-TIME, MR. WOLFOWITZ SAID, WE WANT TO ENSURE OUR ASEAN FRIENDS ARE FULLY AWARE OF THE PURPOSES OF THE CHILDRESS VISIT, WHICH ARE CONFINED TO DISCUSSING POW/MIA'S, PRISON CAMP INMATES AND THE MATHERS CASE. CHILDRESS WILL NOT DISCUSS NORMALIZATION AND, IF ASKED, WILL MERELY REAFFIRM U.S. SUPPORT FOR ASEAN ON CAMBODIA. MOCHTAR EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR MR. WOLFOWITZ'S READOUT, SAYING HE NOW UNDERSTOOD VIETNAMESE MOTIVATIONS IN HANDLING HIS OWN VISIT IN THE WAY THEY HAD.

5. CONTINUING, MR. WOLFOWITZ OBSERVED THE VIETNAMESE EXDIS

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SUBJECT: ASSISTANT SECRETARY WOLFOWITZ'S MEETING HAD LONG ATTEMPTED TO STRING US ALONG ON THE POW/MIA ISSUE. IN THIS LATEST CASE, AS IN THE PAST, THEY HAD HINTED STRONGLY THAT A CHILDRESS VISIT WOULD PRODUCE SUBSTANTIAL RESULTS. ALTHOUGH WE OF COURSE REMAIN SKEPTICAL, WE FELT WE HAD NO CHOICE BUT TO FOLLOW UP ON THIS AND ANY OTHER POSSI-BILITY. OTHERWISE, THE VIETNAMESE WOULD FOLLOW THEIR STANDARD PLOY OF TELLING THE MIA FAMILIES THAT THE USG WAS STONEWALLING ON THE ISSUE. IN ANY EVENT, MR. WOLFOWITZ EMPHASIZED, CHILDRESS'S INSTRUCTIONS WERE VERY EXPLICIT, AND HE WOULD NOT BE DISCUSSING ANYTHING OTHER THAN THESE HUMANITARIAN ISSUES.

6. IN RESPONSE TO MOCHTAR'S QUESTION, MR. WOLFOWITZ CONFIRMED THAT THE MIA ISSUE REMAINED OF MAJOR IMPORTANCE TO THE U.S. FOR THIS REASON, VIETNAMESE HINTS THAT THEY WERE PREPARED TO BE FORTHCOMING HAD IN EFFECT FORCED US TO SEND CHILDRESS AT THIS TIME, DESPITE THE FACT THE VIETNAMESE WOULD PERHAPS ATTEMPT TO USE THE VISIT FOR THEIR OWN PURPOSES. MR. WOLFOWITZ NOTED THEY APPARENTLY WERE ATTEMPTING TO DO THE SAME THING WITH AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK'S REQUEST THAT UN SECGEN PEREZ DE CUELLAR RAISE THESE SAME HUMANITARIAN ISSUES IN HANOI. IN THIS CONNECTION, HE SAID WE HAVE HEARD THEY ARE TELLING DIPLOMATS IN HANOI THAT DE CUELLAR HAD CARRIED A "SPECIAL MESSAGE" OR "LETTER" FROM THE U.S. THIS OF COURSE WAS NOT THE CASE, MR. WOLFOWITZ

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STRESSED. HOWEVER, DE CUELLAR (OR RAFEEUDIN AHMED) HAD APPARENTLY PASSED THE VIETNAMESE A NON-PAPER AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK HAD GIVEN HIM TO ENSURE HE FULLY UNDERSTOOD OUR POLICY SUPPORTING ASEAN ON CAMBODIA. THE PAPER HAD BEEN INTENDED SOLELY FOR DE CUELLAR, AND HE HAD NOT BEEN ASKED TO PASS IT TO THE VIETNAMESE. MOCHTAR SAID DE CUELLAR DID NOT MENTION (#)

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■ OTHER REMARKS ON THE SUBJECT, MR. WOLFOWITZ NOTED VIETNAMESE WILLINGNESS TO BE FORTHCOMING ON MIA'S MIGHT BE OF DIRECT BENEFIT TO THEM IN TERMS OF OUR WILLINGNESS TO HELP FINANCE THEIR SEARCH EFFORTS, BUT EMPHASIZED IT WOULD REQUIRE RESOLUTION OF THE CAMBODIA AND MIA PROBLEMS FOR RELATIONS TO REACH A STAGE TO WARRANT THE NORMAL KINDS OF DIRECT AID PROGRAMS WE HAVE WITH OTHER COUNTRIES.

10. AFTER BRIEFING MR. WOLFOWITZ ON THE RECENT CSIS-SRV SEMINAR IN JAKARTA AND COMMENTING ON U.S.-PRC RELATIONS (SEPTELS), MOCHTAR RETURNED TO THE SUBJECT OF U.S.-SRV NORMALIZATION. IN THIS CONNECTION, HE INDICATED HE THOUGHT THE VIETNAMESE WERE SLOWLY COMING TO REALIZE THEY COULD NOT PREVAIL ON POL POT, BUT THIS WILL NEVER BE ACCEPTABLE TO ANYONE. THE RUSSIANS ARE BACKING THE VIETNAMESE, BUT THEIR INVASION OF CAMBODIA HARMS SOVIET TIES WITH ASEAN AND WITH THE CHINESE. THE ASEANS THEMSELVES HAVE A REASONABLE STRATEGY, BUT "LACK WEIGHT." THUS, HE SAID, ASEAN NEEDS ACTIVE U.S. SUPPORT IN ORDER TO PROVIDE A BALANCE. FOR THIS REASON, MOCHTAR SAID, HE VERY MUCH APPRECIATED MR. WOLFOWITZ'S COMMENTS CLARIFYING U.S. CONDITIONS FOR NORMALIZING RELATIONS WITH VIETNAM.

13. MR. WOLFOWITZ RESPONDED THAT THE U.S. SHARES MOCHTAR'S VIEWS. U.S.-SRV NORMALIZATION WOULD INDEED HELP THE VIETNAMESE MAINTAIN THEIR INDEPENDENCE FROM CHINA AS WELL AS FROM THE SOVIETS. MOREOVER, IT WOULD HELP GIVE THE VIETNAMESE A STAKE IN BEHAVING COOPERATIVELY WITH THEIR NEIGHBORS AND THUS HELP PROMOTE STABILITY IN THE REGION. ON THE OTHER HAND, HE STRESSED THAT NORMALIZATION COULD ONLY COME ABOUT "UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS," I.E., AS A RESULT OF VIETNAMESE WILLINGNESS TO SETTLE THE CAMBODIAN AND MIA ISSUES. AS FOR MOCHTAR'S COMING VISIT TO HANOI, MR. WOLFOWITZ URGED MOCHTAR TO STRESS THE IMPORTANCE

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WE PLACED ON THE MIA ISSUE AND TO REMIND THE
VIETNAMESE THAT WILLINGNESS TO SETTLE THIS PROBLEM
WOULD REMOVE AT LEAST ONE OF THE OBSTACLES STANDING
IN THE WAY OF NORMALIZATION. HOLDRIDGE

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